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Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered
Individuals
Hasan Shafiqullah*
INTRODUCTION
As sex reassignment surgery becomes more commonplace 1 and drag
queens run for the U.S. Presidency,2 the simple days of labeling gender by
unquestioningly assigning blue for boys and pink for girls3 appear to be
passing. With increasing stridency, a growing number of people are questioning what it means to be a woman or a man, and whether they want to be
exclusively either. As individuals push against the limits of settled understandings around sex and gender, society is responding by pushing people
back into simplistic and well-established behavioral and identity categories. 4

* Queer, transgendered, Bangladeshi-American member of the Class of 1997. Special
thanks to Robin Haaland and Shannon Minter for their invaluable insights and support.
1. Peter Pallot, Sex-Change Operations Increase by a Third, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), July 8, 1993, at 5 (noting a three-fold increase in operations in Great Britain
over a seven-year period); Sandra Davie, Mount E Stops All Sex-Change Ops, STRAITS
TIMES (Sing.), July 6, 1992, at 2 (noting how Singapore has "grown to be one of the
world's major centres [sic] for sex-change operations," with over 500 having been performed in the country since the first one in 1971).
2. Achy Obejas, Documentary Goes Blakk to the Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1994, at
2 (discussing the candidacy of San Francisco drag celebrity Joan Jett Blakk).
3. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake 0/ Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation o/Sex/rom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1,63 (1995). Note, however, that "[i]n
the early years of the twentieth century, before World War I, boys wore pink ('a stronger,
more decided color,' according to the promotional literature of the time) while girls wore
blue (understood to be 'delicate' and 'dainty'). Only after World War II ... did the present alignment of the two genders with pink and blue come into being." MARJORIE GARBER,
VESTED INTERESTS: CRoss-DRESSING & CULTURAL ANXIETY 1 (1992), quoted in Franke
supra, at 63 n.256 [hereinafter GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS]'
4. Foucault has put this social reaction in perspective:
Do we truly need a true sex? With a persistence that borders on stubbornness, modern Western societies have answered in the affirmative. They
have obstinately brought into play this question of a "true sex" in an order
of things where one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the body and the intensity of its pleasures.
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Asserting the arbitrariness of gender as a social construction, this Note
will explore and criticize the use of the law to prosecute and persecute people who violate conventional gender roles. Using the emerging concept of a
"trans gender" identity, I will challenge the validity of gender essentialism
and argue for the adoption of variable gender identities.
As a threshold matter, I offer the following defmitions and distinctions:
Sex refers to the biological determination of "male" versus "female;" gender
refers to the socially constructed identities characterized by "masculinity"
and "femininity." For example, while it is a sex distinction that men typically have a larger Adam's apple (thyroid cartilage) than women,5 it is a
gender distinction that most men typically do not wear dresses while many
women at times do. 6
Transvestites are generally defmed as being "anatomic males who have
an episodic, compelling desire to wear women's clothes."7 They are generally heterosexual, and find women's clothes sexually arousing. 8 Crossdressers, by contrast, are either women dressing in traditionally male clothing or men dressing in traditionally female clothing, without the erotic overtones of transvestitism. 9 Transsexuals are considered discontent with the
anatomical sex of their birth, and want to live and dress as the other sex. 10
Intersexed individuals, or in tersexuals , (traditionally known as hermaphrodites) have the physical characteristics of both sexes, 11 and may be diMichel Foucault, Introduction, in HERCULE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED
MEMOIRS OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE vii (Richard McDougall,
trans., 1980) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HERCULE BARBIN].
5. HENRY GRAY, ANATOMY OF THE HUMAN BODY 1366 (30th ed. 1985).
6. See generally GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS, supra note 3.
7. Richard Green, Spelling "Relief" for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination
and the Cn'teria ofSex, 4 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 125, 127 (1985).
8. Id. Whisner, too, notes that '''transvestism' is often used more narrowly to refer
only to cross-dressing for the purpose of sexual arousal." Mary Whisner, Note, GenderSpecific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 97 n.137
(1982).
9. See generally GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS, supra note 3.
10. Specifically, "transsexual ism is 'behaviorally, the act of living and passing in the
role of the opposite sex, before or after having attained hormonal, surgical, and legal sex
reassignment; psychically, the condition of people who have the conviction that they belong to the opposite sex and are driven by a compulsion to have the body, appearance, and
social status of the opposite sex. '" Edward S. David, Note, The Law and Transsexualism:
A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 n.l (1975) (quoting
1. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN: BOY & GIRL 291 (1972».
11. David, supra note 10, at 291. The term "hermaphrodite" is derived from Greek
mythology: "Hermaphroditus, the son of Hermes and Aphrodite, was a beautiful young
man, so fetching that the nymph of the fountain of Salmacis fell desperately in love and
begged the gods to merge her body with his forever. They granted the nymph her wish,
forming a being half-man, half-woman." Natalie Angier, Hermaphrodites Struggle to Find
Identity in Bodies with Ambiguous Genitalia; Newly Formed Group Prefers to be Known
as Intersexuals, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 4, 1996, at 08.
Intersexed individuals are now advocating for the descriptive label "intersexual"
rather than hermaphrodite. Id. See also Anne Fausto-Sterling, Having It All: The Unruly
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vided into three subgroups: those with one testis and one ovary, those with
testes and some aspects of female genitalia, but not ovaries, and those with
ovaries and some aspects of male genitalia, but no testes. 12 Androgyny involves a blending of gender traits or signifiers, rather than of sexual organs,
to create an ambiguous identity which is not overtly male or female. 13
Lastly, transgender is an umbrella term that encompasses transvestites,
cross-dressers, transsexuals, intersexuals, androgynes,14 and those who
simply mix and match elements of "male" and "female" sex/gender identities. I5
Part I provides a context for the discussion. After a brief excursion into
colonial law, I will first address the medical establishment's contribution to
the persecution of transgendered people. In particular, I will consider the
American Psychiatric Association's determination that deviation from expected gender identity indicates mental pathology. I will then turn to the legal system's treatment of transgendered people, particularly cross-dressers.
Part II explores the apparent social need for clear cut boundaries between
sexes, and explains the futility of attempting to establish such rigid demarcations. I will survey recent social attacks against transgendered people, and
then explore and criticize the medical establishment's role in the determination of sex. I will also consider the relative benefits of having medicine versus the law make the determination of sex. Part III briefly critiques essentialist discussions of sex and gender, and reveals the limitations of even
antiessentialist arguments when used in this context. Finally, in Part IV, I
will argue that given the instability of sex and the fluidity of gender, laws
criminalizing cross-dressing and/or "passing" as the opposite gender are an
unjustifiable oppression oftransgendered people.

Bodies of /ntersexuals Blur the Great Divide of a Two-Sex Society, Challenging a System
that has Trouble Dealing With Even Supposedly 'Normal Sex, , VANCOUVER SUN, May 22,

1993, at CIO (noting that "medicine uses the term 'intersex' as a catch-all for three major
subgroups with some mixture of male and female characteristics"--hermaphrodites, male
pseudo-hermaphrodites, and female pseudo-hermaphrodites). This Note will therefore refer to them as intersexuals.
12. Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. I n.147 (1995) (citing Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes Are There? N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29).
13. /d. at 44.
14. /d. at 44 n.3.
15. The colloquial term "gender-fuck" might best describe this latter construction of
identity. "In gender-fuck, people express aspects of both genders at once, like a man in an
evening gown cut low so you can see his chest hair ... , or a woman exposing her cleavage
in a tuxedo." DOSSIE EASTON & CATHERINE A. LIZST, THE BOTTOMING BOOK: OR, How TO
GET TERRIBLE THINGS DoNE TO You BY WONDERFUL PEOPLE 93 (1995).
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I. BACKGROUND-THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
A. THE CASE OF THOMAS(INE) HALL-A LESSON FROM THE PAST

Archival minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia
reveal an interesting case from 1629. 16 An English-born person, christened
Thomasine Hall, had spent childhood dressed as a girl. At age twelve, s/he
was sent to an aunt in London, who dressed her/him as a boy, Thomas. S/he
served as a soldier for a few years, dressed as a man, after which s/he
donned women's apparel, making bone lace and doing other needlework.
When s/he was twenty, Thomas(ine) dressed as a man and came to the Virginia colony, where s/he switched her/his clothing regularly. S/he came to
the attention of the authorities after an alleged sexual encounter with a
plantation owner's maid. When queried by the owner about his/her sex, s/he
answered that s/he was both a man and a woman. An initial forcible examination by the owner and another man revealed Thomas(ine) to have a penis.
At a subsequent examination by a small band of women and men, s/he again
asserted that she was both, explaining that "hee had not the use of the mans
parte . .. was a peece of fleshe growing at the . . . belly as bigg as the topp
of his little finger [an] inch longe . . . ." S/he was ordered by the authorities
to be put into women's apparel. Unsatisfied, the band accosted him/her
again the following week, and asked "if that were all hee had to which hee
answered I have a peece of a hole . ... " Ultimately, the General Court ordered it to be published in the plantation where s/he lived "that hee is a man
and a woeman." It further ordered himlher to dress in men's clothing, "only
his head to bee attired in a Coyfe and Croscloth with an Apron before
him .... "
Hall's case is significant in its revelation of the judicial system's initially
fluid approach to the question of gender and sex. When confronted by an
ambiguous person, the court declared her/him to be both woman and man,
decreeing that s/he go about dressed in a mixture of masculine and feminine
clothing. 17 Unfortunately, this alternative seventeenth-century approach has
not survived. As will be seen, in modern times both medicine and law appear determined to force individuals into distinct but arbitrary categories.

16. Exaicons taken before John Pott Esq gouernor [sic} the 25th day of March AO, in
MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 1622-1632, 16701676, WITH NOTES AND EXCERPTS FROM ORIGINAL COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT RECORDS,
INTO 1683, Now loST 194-95 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1924). The rest of this section will
refer, without citations, to this text.
17. The decision is not without fault. Problematic elements are discussed infra text
following note 167.
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THE MODERN APPROACH: THEPSYCHIATRICATTACK 18

The medical establishment has contributed greatly to the discussion of
gender deviance. 19 In fact, it created the very notion that gender nonconformity is a pathology. Although homosexuality was removed by the
American Psychiatric Association's (APA) list of behavioral pathologies in
1973, the Association eight years later promulgated a new category called
"gender identity dysphoria" (GID).20 The APA uses this new diagnosis in
the same way it had used homosexuality: to pathologize deviance from expected gender or sex norms. 21 Two c~iteria are used to diagnose GID: 1) a
"strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for
any perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex)," and 2) a
"persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. "22
The AP A's diagnostic manual explains that GID is manifested in girls
by a preference for, inter alia, traditional boys' clothing and short hair,
powerful male figures such as Batman or Superman as their fantasy heroes,
and little interest in feminine dress-up or role-play. In boys, the symptoms
are predictably the opposite: playing house, drawing pictures of beautiful
girls and princesses, and playing with dolls. 23 Moreover, afflicted boys
have little interest in cars and trucks or rough and tumble play, and may insist on sitting to urinate. 24 Adults with GID are typically preoccupied with
their wish to live as a member of the opposite sex, and adopt the dress, behavior and mannerisms of that sex. 25 Individuals displaying GID characteristics have been institutionalized. 26

18. For the analysis of the APA attack, I am indebted to National Center for Lesbian
Rights staff attorney Shannon Minter and his unpublished manuscript, From
"Homosexuality" to "Gender Identity Disorder": How Psychiatry Pathologizes Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth (on file with author).
19. The 19th century sexologists' construction of a medical "sexual identity," ultimately
laid the groundwork for the development of "gender deviance." For an excellent discussion of the early medical establishment's role in the formation of the conceptual categories
of sex/gender, see generally JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS,
MYTHS AND MODERN SEXUALITIES (1985).
20. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Con-

jlation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1, 84 (1995).
21. Id. at 85.
22. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION 532-33, 537 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
23. Id. at 533 .

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. For a discussion of individuals institutionalized in the Midwest and Utah because of
their perceived deviance from gender norms, see Carole Rafferty, Homosexuality or
"Disorder"? It's a Fine Line that Psychiatrists Cross Too Often, Many Gays Say, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 1, 1995, at Tempo 1. See also Daphne Scholinski, 1 Was Never Meant to Survive, NCLR NEWSLETTER (Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rts., S.F., Cal.), Spring 1996, at 11 (on
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After creating the notion of pathologic gender deviance, the AP A states
that GID "can be distinguished from simple nonconformity to stereotypical
sex role behavior by the extent and pervasiveness of the cross-gender
wishes."27 It explains that GID is not meant to describe
"tomboyishness" in girls or "sissyish" behavior in boys. Rather, it
represents a profound disturbance of the individual's sense of identity with regard to maleness or femaleness. Behavior in children
that merely does not fit the cultural stereotype of masculinity or
femininity should not be given the diagnosis unless the full syndrome is present, including marked distress or impairment. 28
While this may seem to be a laudable distinction, it offers little practical
guidance. When does "simple nonconformity to stereotypical sex role behavior" cross over into "a profound disturbance" requiring institutionalization? Is (or should) the shift into pathology be based on community standards of acceptable deviance? Would a person who is psychologically
healthy by San Francisco, California, standards be pathologically deviant in
Tucson, Arizona?29
file with author).
Discussing institutionalization of the mad/unreasonable, Foucault notes that it might
be justified insofar as "[t]he madman's [sic] body [is] regarded as the visible and solid
presence of his [sic] disease." MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY
OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 159 (1965) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND
CIVILIZATION]' He traces the interconnections between medicine, morality, and the coercion of those perceived to be unreasonable:
It is important, perhaps decisive for the place madness was to occupy in
modern culture, that homo medicus was not called into the world of confinement as an arbiter, to divide what was crime from madness, what was
evil from what was illness, but rather as a guardian, to protect others from
the vague danger that exuded through the walls of confinement.
ld. at 205. Medicine's role was thus to police the unreasonable, using its coercive power
to cordon off the nominally mad for the safety of the allegedly sane masses.
Foucault asserts elsewhere that "the role of the psychiatrist in penal matters" is "to
suggest a prescription for what might be called [the patient's] 'medico-juridical treatment. '" MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 22 (1977).
In the present context, institutionalizing the "GID afflicted" blurs the line between medicine and law, letting psychiatrists act as prison wardens in order to administer their draconian "medico-juridical treatment."
It must be kept in mind that, ultimately,
"[c]onfinement, that massive phenomenon, ... is a 'police' matter." FOUCAULT, MADNESS
AND CIVILIZATION, at 46. Policing the sick is arguably a troubling notion at best.
27. DSM-IV, supra note 22, at 536 (emphasis in original).
28. Id.
29. It would be frightening to have sanity/mental health contingent on community standards. One moral philosopher, discussing "the tension between individual moral responsibility and obedience to collective norms," suggests that
[w]e must . . . understand the meaning of "wrong," "inadequate," and
"irrational" in the context of an ethical community defined by certain values, values that are intersubjective because they are held by the members of
that community. If you are member of that community, fellow members
can denounce your values as deviant and, conversely, you can defend your
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This discussion is not meant to suggest that the concept of GID is problematic per se, or that the GID diagnosis should be removed from the DSMIV. There are individuals, such as pre-operative transsexuals, who truly are
gender dysphoric: biological women who believe they are men (or vice
versa), and who wish to undergo hormone therapy and perhaps even sex reassignment surgery to resolve the dissonance between their gender identity
and sexual anatomy.30 Without the diagnosis, hormones or sex reassignment surgery would be difficult to obtain, for insurance coverage would be
unlikely.31 Rather than protecting transgendered individuals who do not
suffer from gender identity dysphoria by completely eliminating the GID diagnosis, a more reasonable approach would be to simply hold the medical
establishment accountable for its (mis)use of its diagnostic power.
Ultimately, the question "What constitutes (true) gender deviance?"
raised by the GID diagnosis is overshadowed by the threshold questions
"What is gender?" and "What is biological sex?" After a survey of the legal
system's response to gender deviance, the discussion will turn to these fundamental questions.

C. THE MODERN APPROACH: THE LEGAL ATTACK
1.

Cross-Dressing - Generally

The psychiatric establishment is not alone in its discomfort with those
who do not or cannot act in ways thought to be appropriate for their sex.
Thousands of years ago, the patriarchal authors of the Old Testament decreed that "[a] woman shall not wear anything that pertains to a man, nor
shall a man put on a woman's garment; for whoever does these things is an
abomination to the Lord your God. "32
The legal system in this country has generally adhered to the spirit of
this decree. Among the oldest of the modern cases on point are two New
York cases from the nineteen-sixties: People v. Archibald33 and People v.
Gillespie. 34 Both involved convictions of male cross-dressers under a nowvalues, all under community standards.
Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv. 853, 961
(1992) (emphasis added). In the GID context, there is arguably an inherent danger in
basing psychiatric diagnoses on community standards. Conservatives could, for example,
simply "clean up" their communities by relegating sexual progressives or gender dissidents
to mental institutions.
30. See, e.g., G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556 (1978) (recognizing that transsexual ism "is a serious problem of gender role disorientation," and that the plaintiff's sex
reassignment surgery could not be characterized as mere cosmetic surgery).
31. See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that state
cannot deny Medicaid coverage for sex reassignment surgery, given that surgery is the only
medical treatment available to solve the problems of a true transsexual).
32. Deuteronomy, 22:5 (Revised Standard).
33. 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
34. 202 N.E.2d 565, 254 N. Y.S.2d 121 (1964). Given that Gillespie is a very terse
opinion, I will not attempt a detailed discussion of its jurisprudence.
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superseded statute banning vagrancy. 35 The statute considered a vagrant
any person whose face was "painted, discolored, covered or concealed, or
being otherwise disguised, in a manner calculated to prevent his [sic] being
identified.,,36 The law originally was enacted in 1845 in response to murders of law enforcement agents by Hudson Valley farmers, who killed the
agents as they attempted to serve writs on the farmers. As part of their
guerrilla strategies during these so-called Anti-Rent Riots, the farmers had
concealed their identities by disguising themselves as Indian women, wearing
calico dresses. 37 Far from being the sort of dangerous writ-evading farmer
whose behavior the statute had been enacted to regulate, defendant Archibald was merely standing in drag on a New York City subway platform,
on his way home from a masquerade party, when he was arrested for crossdressing. 38
Elizabeth Kennedy and Madeline Davis, in their history of a lesbian
community in 1940s and '50s Buffalo, N.Y., note that many women reported being harassed under a quasi-legal requirement that women at all
times wear two or three articles of female clothing. 39 One interviewee described at length her harassment for gender deviance:
I've had police walk up to me and say, "Get out of the car." I'm
drivin. ' They say get out of the car; and I get out. And they say,
"What kind of shoes you got on? You got on men's shoes?" And I
say, "No, I got on women's shoes." I got on some basket-weave
women's shoes. And he say, "Well, you damn lucky." 'Cause everything else I had on were men's--shirts, pants. At that time when
they pick you up, if you didn't have two garments that belong to a
woman you could go to jail . . . and the same thing with a
man . . " They call it male impersonation or female impersonation and they'd take you downtown. It would really just be an inconvenience . . .. It would give them the opportunity to whack the
shit out ofyou. 40
35. N.Y. CODE CRlM. PROC. § 887(7)(vagrancy) (1845), superseded by N.Y. PENAL LAW
(loitering) (McKinney 1967).
36. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 887(7) (1845).
37. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (Markowitz, J., dissenting).
38. !d. In response to Archibald and Gillespie, the NY ordinance was modified to exclude masqueraders. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1967).
39. ELIZABETHLAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS
OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF ALESBIAN COMMUNITY 180 (1993). Kennedy and Davis admit
they have been unable to find such a New York State law, aside from the outdated vagrancy statute cited in Archibald and Gillespie. Id. at 411 n.29. They submit that,
"[a]ccording to Professor Nan Hunter of the Brooklyn College of Law School, no such law
exists (personal communication, January 1992). It is her guess that a judge in a particular
case made a ruling that two or three pieces of clothing of the 'correct' sex negated male or
female impersonation and that set a precedent used by law enforcement agencies." Id.
40. !d. at 180 (emphasis added).
§ 240.35
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The homophobic harassment of cross-dressing women by law enforcement officers is not merely a relic of times past. As recently as twenty years
ago, a Texas court found female cross-dressing to be relevant evidence of,
among other things, a murderous motive. In Perez v. State of Texas, a
woman appealed a conviction for murdering her alleged lesbian lover. 41 The
Perez Court considered whether evidence of the existence of an "illicit relationship" between two women could be introduced as part of the relevant
facts and circumstances surrounding the killing. 42 This evidence included
testimony by the deceased's brother-in-law that the defendant, Maria Perez,
had short hair and dressed like a man, and that "she always takes a man's
place."43 He further opined that Perez and his sister-in-law had lived together "like a man and woman would."44
As part of her defense, Perez denied being a lesbian, and explained that,
as a truck farmer, her choice of male clothing was better suited for her
work. 45 Nonetheless, the court found the clothing testimony relevant to the
existence of a relationship between the two women. 46 It also held the photo
"clearly admissible ... as it shows motive as well as being additional proof
that the appellant, through the years, did not dress and look as she did at the
time of trial."4 7 It noted that Perez wore women's clothing and had long
hair during the tria1. 48
Notably absent from the decision was an explanation of why short hair
and pants would be probative of a relationship between Perez and the deceased. The unspoken assumption here is that lesbians wear pants and have
short hair. Such an assumption is underinclusive, as heterosexual women
also wear pants49 and may have short hair.50 These traits are therefore not
defmitive indicia of sexual orientation. 51 Like the Perez court, the police in
4l. Perez v. State of Texas, 491 S.W.2d 672 (1973).
at 673.

42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 675.
46. Id.

47. Id. (emphasis added).

at 675 n.l.
49. Pat Morgan, Wardrobe Workshop: Women Will be Men-Man is Alluring, Mysterious, and Incredibly Sexy. Not to Mention Practical, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 21, 1992, at E4
("The beauty of this fall's menswear look lies in the contradiction ofa feminine woman in
masculine clothes.").
50. '''Long hair doesn't have a style,' said [Joseph] Kendell, recently rated the No. I
hair stylist in Los Angeles. 'Long hair is just long hair and it can take attention away from
your clothes. '" Valli Herman, Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow - But That's the Style, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1991, at L7. Moreover, "[s]ome of the world's sexiest women have
short hair, and look better with it. Can you imagine Jamie Lee Curtis, Dolores O'Riordan
(The Cranberries), Isabella Rossellini, Linda Evangelista or the Princess of Wales with
long hair?" Melanie Rickey, Try Me, INDEPENDENT (London) June 4, 1996, at 13.
51. Long hair and skirts are not the exclusive province of heterosexual women. According to one account of lesbians in Buffalo, N. Y., in the 1940s and 1950s, "ferns", or femi48. Id.
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Buffalo endorsed these erroneous gendered clothing norms in their harassment of lesbians for failure to wear two or three items of "feminine" clothing.
Gay male sex workers dressing as women have at times found themselves targeted by statutes banning cross-dressing generally. 52 In City of
Cincinnati v. Adams,53 for example, the court addressed the following municipal code provision:
No person within the city of Cincinnati shall appear in a dress or
costume not customarily worn by his or her sex, or in a disguise
when such dress, apparel, or disguise is worn with the intent of
committing any indecent or immoral act or of violating any ordinance of the city of Cincinnati or law of the state of Ohio. 54
The sex worker defendant, Adams, argued that his cross-dressing was
protected expression under the First Amendment. 55 The court rejected this
argument, finding no evidence that his choice of attire represented a philosophyor idea1. 56 Although noting that cross-dressing can be regulated "when
it is associated with criminal misconduct and bears a reasonable relation to
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare," the court ultimately found
the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and violative of Adams' Fourteenth
nine lesbians, wore skirts in the 1940s, with only some pants coming into fashion for ferns
in the 1950s. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39, at 156, 162. Even in the 1950s, however,
African-American ferns wore almost exclusively skirts and dresses. Id. at 164. Short hair
was certainly not a fern trait: one fern related that "I had long hair but I wore it up .... It
was usually up in a bun or a french twist or just with a ribbon." Id. at 156.
52. The targeted effect on both gay men and lesbians is not accidental: "Lawenforcement authorities often devote great attention to the enforcement of public sex and loitering
laws against same-sex sexual conduct and solicitation. Gay men and lesbians also have
been subjected to unprovoked violence by police officers, as well as other forms of police
harassment." Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1542 (1989).
.
Such legal and illegal use of state force to regulate morality is deeply implicated in
the legal control of gender deviance. In the sex work context, the moral issue of JudeoChristian condemnation of prostitution ("Do not profane your daughter by making her a
harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry and the land become full of wickedness." Leviticus,
19:29 (Revised Standard)) is obvious; in the more "innocent" case of high schoolers cross
dressing at a prom, discussed infra note 58 and accompanying text, the moral connection is
more tenuous, hence the affront arguably more readily recognizable. Discussing the coercive regulation of morality, Foucault notes that "we see inscribed in the institutions of absolute monarchy ... the ... idea that virtue, too, is an affair of the state, that decrees can
be published to make it flourish, that an authority can be established to make sure it is respected. " FOUCAULT, MADNESS & CIVILIZATION, supra note 26, at 61.
53. 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio 1974).
54. CINCINNATI, Omo, MUN. CODE § 909-5 (emphasis added). The focus on indecency
and immorality sets this code apart from the ordinances in Wilson and McConn, infra notes
71, 73 and accompanying text, which were amoral, blanket prohibitions against gender
role deviance.
55. 330 N.E.2d. at 464.
56. Id. at 465.
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Amendment right to due process. 57
In a case involving a more innocuous type of cross dressing than the
charged issues of gay male sex work or lesbian murder, an Ohio high school
refused to allow two of its students to cross-dress at their prom. 58 The boy
appeared wearing a dress, a fur cape, earrings, stockings, and high heels; his
sister wore a black tuxedo and men's shoes. 59 Upon refusing the principal's
request to leave, they were escorted from the ballroom by police. 60 In court,
the students asserted that the school's refusal to allow their cross-dressing
violated the Equal Protection Clause, since female students were permitted
to wear dresses and male students to wear tuxedos. Granting summary
judgment against the students' civil rights action, the district court found
both that the school's dress code was "reasonably related to the valid educational purposes of teaching community values and maintaining school discipline," and that the school's actions did not violate any rights the students
might have under the First Amendment. 61 In terms of the Equal Protection
challenge, the court decreed that "[t]he school dress code does not differentiate based on sex. [It] requires all students to dress in conformity with the
accepted standards of the community. "62 In so holding, the court refused to
question the oppressively gendered nature of the community standards.
The court's decision in Harper did not occur in a historical vacuum.
Fourteen years earlier, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated an Idaho school
district's dress code that barred female students from wearing pants. 63 The
regulation declared that "[a]ny type of clothing or attire which attracts undue attention to the wearer and thus causes a disturbance in the school or in
the classroom is not acceptable. Girls are expected to wear dresses or skirts
which are not more than two inches above the knee . . . ."64 The school
Board of Trustees construed the "dresses or skirts" section to mean only
those items were allowed, which in effect barred female students from
wearing pants. 65
In justifying this restriction, the school board alleged that "the wearing
of culottes, slacks or pantsuits by female students" results in
(1) a detrimental effect on the morals of the students attending the
57. Id. (emphasis added). The court held unconstitutionally vague both the phrase "not
customarily worn," and the statutory element of intent to commit any "indecent" or
"immoral" act. Id. at 465-66.
58. Harper v. Edgewood Bd. ofEduc., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
59. Id. at 1354.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1355 (emphasis added). The court also rejected the argument that the students' removal by police had violated their right to due process. Id.
62. Id. at 1356.
63. Johnson v. Joint School District No. 60, Bringham County, 508 P.2d 547 (Idaho
1973).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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school and upon the educational process;
(2) unsafe conditions and safety hazards at the schools;
(3) insubordination, rebelliousness and lack of respect for authority;

(4) loss of respect for, and damage to, school property;
(5) a detrimental effect upon the general attitude of the students;
(6) an increased amount of physical contact and familiarity between
boys and girls in school surroundings;
(7) loss of standards of conduct; and
(8) a detrimental effect on emotional makeup and problems in the
school district. 66

Given the Board's failure to substantiate any of these outlandish claims,
the court upheld the trial court's finding that female students in pants had
not disrupted the school's disciple or instructional effectiveness, and did not
have a detrimental effect on the safety or morals of their fellow students. 67
The record is silent on the Board's justification for its stated fearr-it provided no examples of pants creating unsafe conditions or safety hazards, or
causing loss of respect for, or damage to, school property. Whisner notes
that "gender differentiation was obviously important to this school district.
It sensed social chaos resulting from a breakdown in gender distinction by
dress; girls in pants were threatening."68 It is unclear why the Board
thought that women in anything but skirts or dresses would undermine the
very fabric (so to speak) of school society. What is clear is the perceived
threat to the all-male69 Board in response to women wearing clothing traditionally worn only by men. 70
66. Id. at 548.
67. Id.
68. Whisner, supra note 8, at 103.
69. During the 1971-72 school year, the Board was comprised of Jack Draney (chair),
Vance Barnett, Dale Jolley, Eugene Humphries, and Bob Kirkham. Letter to author from
Trish Dixon, Secretary to Charles 1. Shackett, Superintendent of Schools, Shelley Jt.
School District No. 60 (July 22, 1996) (on file with author).
70. One commentator notes that
[i]n a patriarchal, sexist society, power is controlled by men, and women
are considered biologically and socially inferior. This rigid social order is
reflected in sex specific rules for gender behavior. Gender expectations in
contemporary American society include an implicit value assumption:
whatever males do is "masculine," normal, and therefore good, whatever
women do is "feminine" and intrinsically inferior.
Meredith Gould, Sex, Gender, and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case for Transsexual-
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Cross Dressing - Transsexuals

The preceding cases reveal the legal system's general aversion to and
discomfort with cross-dressers. Courts have, however, allowed some individuals to cross-dress so long as they were undergoing therapy in preparation for sex reassignment surgery. One such case, City of Chicago v. Wi/son,71 concerned a statute prohibiting any person from appearing "in a
public place . . . in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, with intent to
conceal his or her sex. "72 The court held that, as applied to the defendants,
preoperative transsexuals under a doctor's care, the ordinance was an unconstitutional infringement of their liberty interests. 73 In the course of its
analysis, the court considered Chicago's arguments for the total ban on
cross-dressing in public:
1) to protect citizens from being misled or defrauded;
2) to aid in the description and detection of criminals;
3) to prevent crimes in washrooms; and
4) to prevent inherently antisocial conduct which is contrary to
the accepted norms of our society. 74
The fIrst and fourth criteria are particularly interesting. The combined
notion that anyone not conforming to the accepted gender norms of society
must be perpetrating an actionable fraud is telling of society's fear of and
discomfort with the disruption of rigid behavioral categories. Furthermore,
it reveals the normative nature of the strict male/female sexual binary within
which the conventional gender discourse is set. This sexual binarism will be
addressed more fully below.
Although at times magnanimously allowing cross-dressing by transsexuals, courts have fallen far short of actually protecting such behavior
from discrimination. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals from employment discrimination. In
ism, 13 VAL. U. L. REv. 423, 431 (1979). Given that men control this society (implicitly
at the expense of women's empowennent), it stands to reason that men would jealously
guard not only their power but the cultural signifiers of that power. Pants being traditionally "male," it is not surprising that the male legal establishment would try to take
steps to ensure that pants would be socially off-limits to women.
71. 389 N.E.2d 522, 523 (Ill. 1978).
72. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 192-8 (emphasis added).
73. 389 N.E.2d at 525. In Doe I v. McConn, 489 F.Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a
federal court presented with a statute similar to the one in Wilson, followed Wilson in
holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. The statute in McConn,
HOUSTON, TEX., CODE ORDINANCES § 28-42.4 (1972), read: "It shall be unlawful for any
person to appear on any public street, sidewalk, alley, or other public thoroughfare dressed
with the designed intent to disguise his or her true sex as that of the opposite sex." Id.
74. 389 N.E.2d at 524 (emphasis added).

711

_e

_Nt

208

tite'

':=rtM""iiTtiitfW

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:1

Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, an airline pilot who joined Eastern Airlines as a
biological man subsequently underwent sex reassignment surgery; she was
then fIred for '''no reason other than the fact that she ceased being a male
and became a female. "'75 Finding no statutory support in Title VII for
transsexuals, the Seventh Circuit overturned a progressive district court decision holding that the statute's remedial purposes should be construed liberally enough to encompass sexual identity. 76 In reaching that decision,
District Court Judge Grady had determined, inter alia, that "it is a question
of one's own self-perception. How does one perceive oneself in terms of
maleness or femaleness? It is also a social matter: How does society perceive the individual?"77 While sympathetic to the obvious justice of Judge
Grady's decision, the Seventh Circuit overturned his ruling on jurisdictional
grounds. 78 In doing so, it was following a Ninth Circuit decision, Holloway
v. Arthur Andersen and Co. 79
In Holloway, the court addressed the fIring of a pre-operative male-tofemale transsexual soon after she announced her intention to undergo sex reassignment surgery. 80 Noting that the district court had not reached the
merits of the case, the appellate court limited itself to the question of
whether Title VII allowed an employee to be discharged for initiating the
process of sex transformation. 81 Reading the statute narrowly, the court

75. 742 F.2d 1081, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985)
(quoting the opening argument of Ulane's counsel). Ulane's qualifications were not disputed: she had "a record of combat missions in Vietnam for which [she] received an Air
Medal with eight clusters." Id. at 1082. At Eastern, she "progressed from Second to First
Officer, and also served as flight instructor, logging over 8,000 flight hours." Id. at 108283. Both the appellate and lower court opinions are discussed in D. Douglas Cotton, Note,
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (1986).
76. Id. at 1084, overturning Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
77. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825.
78. The court stated that "[w]hile we do not condone discrimination in any form, we are
constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals, and that the district court's
order on this count therefore must be reversed for lack of jurisdiction." 742 F.2d at 1084
(footnote omitted).
79. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), cited in Ulane, 581 F. Supp. 821, passim.
80. Id. at 661.
81. Id. In terms of the merits, the court stated that the supervisor's
affidavit detailed many of the personnel problems created by appellant's
transitional appearance (red lipstick and nail polish, hairstyle, jewelry and
clothing), his [sic] use of the men's room and his [sic] behavior at social
functions. We note that the district court failed to consider the facts when
making its determination, even though [the supervisor] stated that Holloway was not terminated because of transsexualism, "but because the dress,
appearance and manner he {sic] was affecting were such that it was very
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned."
Id. at 661 n.1 (quoting an affidavit by Holloway's supervisor, Marion Passard) (emphasis

added). The termination was thus in effect a "heckler's veto": coercion of the individual
to accommodate the discomfort of intolerant others.
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found "sex" to not encompass transsexualism. 82 The dissenting opinion
opted for a less restrictive reading of the law. Conceding that Congress had
"probably never contemplated that Title VII would apply to transsexuals,"
the dissenting judge nonetheless asserted that he "would not limit the right to
claim discrimination to those who were born into the victim class .... The
relevant fact is that she was, on the day she was ftred, a purported female."83
While praiseworthy for recognizing and respecting Holloway's temporally shifting sexual identity, the dissent implicitly raised a deceptively simple question that underlies every transsexual case and many transgendered
cases generally: How do we determine what sex a person is at any given
point in time? The following section will address this question.

II. THE "NEED" FOR GENDER CLARITY
A. (ANTI) SOCIAL REACTION AND HOSTILITY
my spirit is too ancient to understand the separation of
soul & gender/ my love is too delicate to have thrown
back on my face 84
The medical and legal establishments' intolerance of gender deviance
has not persisted in a vacuum. Individual members of society have been
forthcoming in their own violent expressions of fear and hatred of those who
blur gender boundaries. Discussing the social control of erotic sexuality,
Gayle Rubin notes that "[s]ex law is not a perfect reflection of the prevailing
moral evaluations of sexual conduct. Erotic sexual variation per se is more
speciftcally policed by mental-health professionals, popular ideology, and
extra-legal social practice. "85 The same applies to gender variation. A
handful of recent cases, reflecting popular gender ideology and the extralegal social practices used to punish gender deviants, reveal the "degree of
anger and social opprobrium that can be unleashed when a gender outlaw's
fraud is revealed to the public."86
82. Id. at 663 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 664. The dissent further stated, a bit glibly, that "this is a case of a person
completing surgically that part of nature's handiwork which apparently was left incomplete
somewhere along the line." Id.
84. NTOZAKE SHANGE, FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO HAVE CONSIDERED SUICIDE WHEN THE
RAINBow IS ENUF - A CHOREOPOEM 45 (1977).
85. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 288 (Carole Vance ed.,
1984).
86. Franke, supra note 3, at 22. Foucault notes:
if nature, through its fantasies or accidents, might "deceive" the observer
and hide the true sex for a time, individuals might also very well be suspected of dissembling their inmost knowledge of their true sex and of
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In 1995, Debbie Forte, a Massachusetts pre-operative transsexual, was
stabbed to death by a new lover who flew into a murderous rage upon discovering that Forte was biologically male. 87 Two years earlier, a 21-yearold Nebraskan known as Brandon Teena (or Teena Brandon), who identified
as a male although biologically female, suffered a similar fate. Two of his
friends, suspicious of the truth of his biological sexual identity, accosted him
during a Christmas Eve party: pinning his arms behind him in a bathroom,
they pulled down his pants and forced his girlfriend to look and verify that
he had a vagina. 88 After the party, the two erstwhile friends savagely beat
him, forced him into a car, and drove him to a deserted parking lot outside of
town, where they took turns raping him.89 A week later, they drove to his
home, an isolated farmhouse, and shot and stabbed him to death before
shooting and killing the two witnesses. 90 Only the infant son of one of the
witnesses was spared. 91
These cases reveal the visceral, violent reaction some people have
against those who fail to conform to traditional sex/gender roles and appearances. Others have reacted less violently but no less offensively. Sean
O'Neill (born Sharon Clark), a biological female identifying as male, had
numerous underage girlfriends during his late teens.92 In 1995, after the
girlfriends' parents suspected that he had a vagina rather than a penis, he
was charged with eleven felony counts of sexual assault, criminal impersonation of the opposite gender, and sexual assault on a child. 93 He later
pled guilty to a single count of sexual assault. 94 This case "may be the first
profiting from certain anatomical oddities in order to make use of their
bodies as if they belonged to the other sex. In short, the phantasmagorias
of nature might be of service to licentious behavior, hence the moral interest that inhered in the medical diagnosis of the true sex.
FOUCAULT, HERCULE BARBIN, supra note 4, at ix. Perhaps it is "moral" outrage at the gender deception that explains the violence of the cases discussed immediately below.
87. Bill Hutchinson, DA Says New Lover Killed Man He Thought Was a She, BOSTON
HERALD, June 3, 1995, at 006.
88. Julie Wheelwright, The Boyfriend: "He Was a Lot of Girls' Dream Guy, " According to a Friend. There Was Just One Problem: He Wasn't a Guy, GUARDIAN (London),
Feb. 20, 1996, at T006.

89. Id.
90. Id. One of the murderers testified at trial that, soon after the rape, the two had
planned to murder Brandon, with part of the plan involving "chopping off his hands and
head to avoid identification." They had "carried an axe, rope and change of clothing" to
the victim's town, but were unable to find him for several days. Id.
91. Id. One of the murderers received three consecutive life sentences, the other was
sentenced to death. Dawn Fallik, Man Gets Death in Slaying of Cross Dresser and 2 Others, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 1996, at llA.
92. Donna Minkowitz, On Trial: Gay? Straight? Boy? Girl? Sex? Rape?, OUT
MAG., Oct. 1995, at 99.
93. Id.

94. James Green, Predator? Last Week 20-year-old Sean 0 'Neill Got Sent to Prison as
a Rapist and Sex Offender Because He Slept With His 15-year-old Girlfriend Back When
He Was 17. His Real Crime: He Was Born in a Woman's Body, BAY TIMES (San Francisco), Feb. 22, 1996, at 2, 29 [hereinafter 1. Green, Predator?]. O'Neill was sentenced to
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time law enforcement has treated gender deception as something tantamount
to rape."95
It also represents perhaps the most egregious example of the law's discomfort with gender elasticity. Prosecutors, anxious to determine the defendant's sex before proceeding with their case, managed to convince a judge to
sign "a court order to haul Sean into a hospital emergency room to have a
doctor determine his gender [sic] once and for all."96
B. DETERMINING SEx/GENDER

There is nothing concealed that will not be revealed, or hidden
that will not be known.
Therefore whatever you have said in the dark shall be heard in the
light, and whatever you have whispered in private rooms shall be
proclaimed on the housetops.97
By resorting to a warrant to determine the sex of the youth before pursuing the case, the prosecutor opted for what might have seemed the easiest
option: looking at genitals to establish biological sex. In so doing, the district attorney was acting consistently with legal and medical tradition. 98 In
City of Chicago v. Wilson, for example, the cross-dressing defendants were
hauled into the police station and were forced to "pose for pictures in various states ofundress."99 Similarly, suspects under the ordinance at issue in
Doe I v. McConn were required to disrobe to help officers determine
whether the suspects truly were dressing as the opposite sex. 100
Similar "look tests" for determining biological sex are used regularly in
obstetric wards to name a child as a "boy" or "girl." This original naming
based on visual inspection of the body is given great weight: 101
Once the body is read, two things happen: text is subordinated to
"90 days in the county jail, deferred until accommodations could be made so that Sean will
not have to be housed with women or men, in consideration of his transgender status." Id.
95. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 100. The sentencing judge proclaimed, "This case is
not about pedophilia, not about homosexuality, not about love or trust. This case is about
deceit and consistency." J. Green, Predator?, supra note 94, at 29 (emphasis added).
96. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 142.
97. Luke 12:2-3 (Revised Standard).
98. Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979). Dunlap argues that "[t]he law
defines every person as either male or female by reference to the genital anatomy of that
person." Id. at 1132.
99. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978). See also supra note 71 and
accompanying text. The strip search revealed that "[b]oth defendants were wearing brassieres and garter belts; both had male genitals." Id.
100. Doe I v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. Tex. 1980). See also supra note 73.
101. David, supra note 10, at 292 ("In short, a doctor or even a lay attendant says, 'It's a
boy' or 'It's a girl.' This perfunctory determination has enduring legal significance.").
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interpretation, and later re-readings are not permitted-narrative
time suddenly stops. As such, the birth attendant's declaration of
the baby's sex is performative rather than descriptive, creating
rather than describing the child's sex. 102
These traditions notwithstanding, biological sex is not as easily ascertainable as one might assume. Intersexuals, particularly those with ambiguous genitals or with the external genitals of one sex but the gonads of another, demonstrate that even the "look test" can at times be of little use. 103
A person with a genital tubercle poses even greater challenges, since s/he
could be said to have either a large clitoris or a small penis. I 04
In fact, external genitalia are but one of a number of factors used by
medical professionals to detennine sex. Relevant indicia include:
1. sex chromosome constitution;
2. gonadal sex;
3. sex honnonal pattern;
4. internal sex organs other than gonads (e.g., uterus or sperm
ducts);
5. external genitalia;
6. secondary sexual characteristics (e.g., facial hair);
7. sex of rearing (usually the sex assigned at birth); and

102. Franke, supra note 3, at 53, drawing from JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER
237 (1993). Butler herself notes that "[t]he 'naming' of sex is an act of domination and
compulsion, an institutionalized perfonnative that both creates and legislates social reality
by requiring the discursive/perceptual construction of bodies in accord with principles of
sexual difference." JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 115 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE].
103. Douglas K. Smith, Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the
Law, 56 CORNELLL. REv. 963,963 n.t (1971).
104.
This organ [the genital tubercule] has an open gutter underneath it instead
of a covered urethral tube. The urinary oriface [sic] is at its root or base,
more or less in the female position. The opening at the base may be small
and lead directly to the bladder; or it may be a quite large urogenital sinus
from the interior of which can be traced both the urethral and vaginal passages. The latter may either connect with the cervix of the uterus or end
blindly. Outside and below the opening, it will be ambiguous whether
there is a scrotum with incomplete fusion or labia majora more fused than
they should have been.
JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES 41 (1968), quoted in
Note, Transsexuals in Limbo, 31 MD. L. REV. 236, 237 n.9 (1971) [hereinafter Limbo].
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8. assumed or psychological sex, also called "gender identity." 105
While somewhat helpful, these indicia are ultimately inadequate. Intersexuals could be classified as males by one test and as females by another. 106 Moreover, there are cases in which single factors alone would still
fail to render unambiguous results. I 07 The sex chromosome test, the most
medically "precise" of the eight indicia, is exemplary in this regard.

1.

Sex Chromosome Test

The appeal of the sex chromosome test lies in the fact that, of the fortysix pairs of chromosomes in the "normal" human, males have one XY pair,
while females have an XX pair.108 Theoretically, the routine detection of
either an XY or XX pair would allow the test subject to be neatly placed in
one of the two traditional sex categories. Those with genetic "defects,"
however, complicate the easy binary. Turner's syndrome (XO pattern, with
"0" being lack of a chromosome), Klinefelter's syndrome (XXY pattern),
and "meta-female" (XXX pattern) all defy an easy categorization. 109
Since 1968, the sex chromosome test has been used in the Olympics to
verify the "gender" of all female athletes. I I 0 The test was instituted as a
regular practice after one female athlete who won medals in the 1964
105. Limbo, supra note 104, at 236 n.lO. See also David, supra note 10, at 290-91;
Smith, supra note 103, at 965.
106. David, supra note 10, at 291.
107. Jd.
108. Jd. at 291 n.8; see also Wayne Scott Cole, Comment, Transsexuals in Search of Legal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
331, 333 n.9 (1978).
109. David, supra note 10, at n.8. The import of these categories is dismissed by some:
"I personally am inclined to see slicing sex that finely as either trivial and irrelevant (given
the minuscule number of people in other than the two generally recognized sexes) ...."
Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, n.35 (1995)
(discussing "intermediate hermaphroditic sexes").
The actual numbers, however, are not "miniscule." One source places the number
of babies born with ambiguous external genitalia at approximately one in 2,000. Angier,
supra note 11, at D8. Such babies are generally subjected to "corrective" surgery, by
which their genitals are mutilated to approximate exclusively male or female genitalia. Jd.
Case's trivialization reveals a mistaken underestimation of the radical destabilizing effect
of atypical sexual categories. The destabilization is revealed by the medical reaction to
intersexed individuals. "When an infant is born with ambiguous genitals, a hospital will
instantly rally its experts into a huddle-----surgeons, geneticists, endocrinologists, psychiatrists--with the goal of deciding, is this really a girl or really a boy?" Jd.
Intersexed individuals have at times suffered fates worse than merely being defined
as medically abnormal. As Foucault notes, "[f]or a long time hermaphrodites were criminals, or crime's offspring, since their anatomical disposition, their very being, confounded
the law that distinguished the sexes and prescribed their union." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (1978).
110. Pamela B. Fastiff, Note, Gender Verification Testing: Balancing the Rights of Female Athletes with a Scandal-Free Olympic Games, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 937, 938
(1992).
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Olympics was later discovered to be a "man" when testing revealed the presence of the Y (male) chromosome'! 11
This testing practice has been criticized as being over- and underinclusive: it identifies women with genetic defects who have no muscular advantage, while missing those who do have such an advantage. 112 Moreover,
genetically abnormal "males," such as XXY and :xx males, would pass the
test, and would have to be allowed to compete as women, in spite of the fact
that they "may have a normal male body build, male muscle strength, and a
male psychological and social orientation."113
In addition to its predictive inaccuracy, the test presents constitutional
concerns in some contexts. In the case of a transsexual marrying or modifying her/his birth certificate, using the test may violate herlhis right to equal
protection, since "[t]here is no rational relation between the chromosome test
and any state interest in these two contexts."114 A thorough exploration of
this particular issue is beyond the scope of this Note'! 15
2.

The Eight Factors

Rather than using the sex chromosome test, many commentators advocate using a mixture of the eight indicia, with an emphasis on psychology
and gender self-identity. Smith argues that "the psychological sex of an individual should be the single most important standard used to judge his [sic]
legal sex.,,116 Others concur, using somewhat synonymous terms: "the
eighth factor, gender identity, is arguably the most important;"117 "[t]he essential criterion is gender or sexual identity, namely whether the person
considers himself or herself to be a male or a female."1l8 Franke cautions
that "[t]o conceptualize both sexual identity and sex discrimination in terms
of biology at all is to ignore the role that gender stereotypes play in the construction of sexual difference."119
111. Id. at 939. There have been no "impostors" since. Id. at 940. Nonetheless, the
testing continues. In fact, the International Olympic Committee is even considering
switching to the more straightforward visual examination. Karen Rosen, Visual Inspection
for Gender Replacing Chromosome Test, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Dec. 5,1991, at F6.
112. Fastiff, supra note 110, at 944.
113. Id. at 944-45.
114. Cole, supra note 108, at 355. Cole considers and rejects several possible state interests that might justify sex chromosome testing under rational basis review pursuant to
the Equal Protection clause: the state interest in same sex marriage; in the ability to consummate the marriage; in discouraging homosexual conduct; in procreation; in administrative convenience; in accuracy of public records; in preventing fraud; in using public records
to aid the psychologically ill; and in birth certificates reflecting facts at the time of birth.
Id. at 345-54.
115. For a general discussion, see Cole, supra note 108.
116. Smith, supra note 103, at 969.
117. David, supra note 10, at 292.
118. Green, supra note 7, at 126.
119. Franke, supra note 3, at 39. She argues for the "cultural genital," which
is a metaphor for both the physical genital that is not presently in view but
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Another group of commentators calls for a balancing of the various
factors. Cole suggests that "courts should . . . reject the chromosome test
and instead adopt the gender-anatomy test of sex."120 A concurring Note
posits that "U]udicial fairness requires that society determine sex on the basis of psychological identity and anatomical appearance."121 Fastiff, on the
other hand, would "take into consideration not only a person's chromosomes, but her external appearance and her own gender identity."122 This
latter approach was adopted by Judge Grady in the overturned lower court
decision extending Title VII protection to transsexuals. 123

C.

LA W VERSUS MEDICINE

With eight factors to balance and choose between, the question arises:
who should do the balancing? There has been much debate in legal scholarship about whether law or medicine should determine what constitutes sexual identity. Some assert that law should not decide questions of sex, but
should instead "accept medical decisions in this area and give them the legal
effect that is in the best interests of the individual or society."124 This argument assumes that courts must defer to the expertise of doctors, "for at its
base, sex determination is an extra-legal matter, becoming legal only under
certain conditions." 125
Other commentators, however, point out that medicine is merely descriptive, while the law is normative. 126 Franke argues that "the law's relationship to sexual identity" can be understood by comparing
the difference between judicial statements that describe a state of affairs and judicial statements that bring about a state of affairs . . . .
These two types of juridical speech acts are imbued with two different kinds of normativity . . .. In the ftrst case, the aspiration is that
the judge's words fit the world, whereas in the second case the

which the person is assumed to have and the gendered schema that constructs women as certain kinds of beings and men as their opposite. This
schema is made manifest in a system of gendered cues that communicates
the signs of gender, signs that we regard as reliable signifiers of one's "true
sex."
ld. (citing HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 116-85 (1967».
120. Cole, supra note 108, at 355.
121. Limbo, supra note 104, at 254.
122. Fastiff, supra note 110, at 961.
123. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825 (recognizing the chromosome test, self-perception and
social perception as all informing the determination of sex). See also supra notes 76-77
and accompanying text.
124. Smith, supra note 103, at 972.
125. Gould, supra note 70, at 432.
126. David, supra note 10, at 338. Moreover, "[a]dopting a medical model has ... serious and severe limitations because it shifts the locus of responsibility from society to the
individual." Gould, supra note 70, at 441.
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world is changed to fit the judge's words. 127
The transgender cases reveal that judges are exercising the latter type of
juridical speech-changing the world through their words. The Seventh
Circuit's decision in Ulane is a prime example of judicial construction of
sexual identity:
Ulane is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity she
desires. After the surgery, hormones, appearance changes, and a
new Illinois birth certificate and FAA pilot's certificate, it may be
that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane to be female.
But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created
from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case. 128
The tone of the opinion suggests that the original sexual declaration
("It's a boy!"), by a long-forgotten birth attendant who could not have possibly known that the infant KennethlKaren' s gender did not match hislher
physical sex, was still controlling for the Ulane court. By denying her claim
of sex discrimination, the court implicitly derogated Karen's claim that she
was truly female. By invalidating her expressed sexuaVgender identity, the
court's opinion inevitably helped to shape and color society's shared understanding of sexual reality. Thus the holding in Ulane quietly proclaimed
that even sex reassignment will not necessarily ensure social recognition of
one's self-perceived gender identity.
Through its trans gender jurisprudence, the legal system creates our
shared social reality. Legislators and judges should be careful to craft gender policy based on a totality of the social and individual factors.
David has argued for placing the locus of determinative weight with either the executive or legislature, according to medicine's explanatory ability.
He suggests that administrative agencies can make the determination in easy
cases, meaning for those individuals for whom medicine can provide precise
and easily understood tests. If simple tests would not suffice, as they would
not for an XXY male with an outwardly female appearance, or for an intersexual, the legislature should make the determination. 129 His argument concerning the hard cases is interesting. Were society's elected representatives
to pass laws defming sex, we would return to the judicial approach of the
seventeenth century Viriginia General Court's decision in Thomas(ine) Hall.
This mayor may not be the best answer, but it is safe to say at least that the
127. Franke, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis added).
128. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1987 (emphasis added).
129. David, supra note 10, at 338. One Note suggests a "joint undertaking" by both the
medical and legal communities, involving an "interprofessional recognition and advancement of the idea that individuals have more social utility and economic capacity if they are
psychologically and anatomically congruent." Jeannine S. Haag & Tami L. Sullinger, Is
He or Isn't She? Transsexualism: Legal Impediments to Integrating a Product of Medical
Definition and Technology, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 342, 371 (1982).

,

,

Winter 1997]

SHAPE-SHIFTERS & MASQUERADERS

217

courts' reliance on medical knowledge alone "might be considered at best
myopic." 130
If law is to be the institution making the decision,131 one commentator
suggests that "[b]ecause the law is primarily concerned with human relationships, only those biological factors which influence person-to-person interactions should be criteria used in determining a person's legal sex."132 This
offers little practical guidance, however, not least because of the arguable
cultural relativity of the social perception of biological traits. 133
Ultimately, the key to resolving this problem lies in recognizing that the
legal field is an unstable "interpretive field of practice where identifications
may be shifted and reformed."134 When the discussion moves beyond established identities, when "nonidentities" are formulated, a powerful
"dialectical engagement between subject positions and juridical fields of
power" is revealed. 135 In practice, the transgendered subject is interacting
with and being shaped by the interpretive fields of both medicine and law.
On a more theoretical level, slhe is faced with one of the "juridical fields of
power" most inimical to a positive and fluid transgender identity: the field
of legal theory known as essentialism, particularly sex/gender essentialism.

III. TRADITIONAL SEX/GENDER ESSENTIALISM
A. ESSENTIALISM

Essentialism can be defmed as "a belief in true essence--that which is
most irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a given person or
thing."136 In the present context, essentialism would posit that women and
men "are identified as such on the basis of transhistorical, eternal, immutable essences."137 There would be, in other words, something in each that
was inherently woman or inherently man. Given that each had a different
essence, comparisons between the two would be pointless, even problematic:
130. Gould, supra note 70, at 432.
131. Use of the law is not without severe limitations. Patricia Williams notes, in a discussion of the law and race, that "the constitutional foreground of rights was shaped by
whites, parceled out to blacks in pieces, ordained from on high in small favors, random
insulting gratuities." PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF ALAW
PROFESSOR 164 (1991). Similar problems plague each disempowered group in its pursuit
of rights: begging for crumbs of legitimacy from the mainstream masters. The transgendered are certainly not excepted.
132. Limbo, supra note 104, at 241.
133. Gould, supra note 70, at 430 ("Social standards for femininity and masculinity will
alter as cultural determinants shift .... Thus what constitutes 'masculinity' in one epoch
might well constitute 'femininity' in another.").
134. Lisa C. Bower, Queer Acts and the Politics of "Direct Address": Rethinking Law,
Culture, and Community, 28 L. & Soc. REV. 1009,1014 (1994).
135. Id. at 1015.
136. DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE 2 (1989).
137. Id. at xi.
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better to take each on its own terms, and judge the sexes by their own standards. 138 In classical legal terms, essentialism calls for an analysis of
women sui generis: in a class by themselves, outside the scope of a traditionally patriarchal legal structure which has consistently devalued them.
History reveals, however, that consideration sui generis has done little
to advance the cause of women's struggle for independence and liberation.
Over a century ago, in the course of upholding a law denying women the
right to practice law, the U.S. Supreme Court used essentialist language in
explaining that
[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life . . ., The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. 139
These views are unfortunately not merely the curious artifacts of nineteenth century jurisprudence. Less than twenty years ago, the Supreme
Court drew on essentialist notions in holding that a "woman's relative ability
to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified penitentiary ...
could be directly reduced by her womanhood.,,140
In the present context, an essentialist would resist accepting the notion
of a trans gender identity. If men and women have immutable essences, how
could a manly essence be housed in a woman, or vice versa? For those who
mix and match elements of either gender (e.g., those engaging in genderfuck
drag I41 ), the either/or categories are patently unusable. A radical dyke
wearing, for instance, a tuxedo with a strap-on dildo protruding prominently
through the fabric over the crotch of her pants is arguably not adhering to a
universal female essence. Of course, if the concept of female essence were
more expansive, such variation could be included in its definition. But recognition of such variation would necessarily debase the strict purity required
by the essentialist project.
B. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM/SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
Standing in staunch opposition to essentialist thought are the construc-

138. Essentialism should not be confused with difference feminism. Some advocates of
the di fference feminism, such as Carol Gilligan, argue that not only do women and men
have distinct and mutually exclusive traits, but gender alone actually determines an individual's perspective on legal and moral issues. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Essentialism, on the other hand, "is typically defined in opposition to di fference; the doctrine of essence is viewed as precisely that which seeks to deny
or to annul the very radicality of difference." Fuss, supra note 136, at xii.
139. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (130 Wall.) 141 (1873).
140. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
141. Defined supra note 15.
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tionists, who argue that "essence" itself is historically constructed. 142 These
anti-essentialists argue for "interrogating the intricate and interlacing processes which work together to produce all seemingly 'natural' or 'given' objects."143 At heart, they are concerned "with the production and organization of differences, and they therefore reject the idea that any essential or
natural givens precede the processes of social determination."144
Some of the more critical anti-essentialists have gone even further,
charging that the supposedly universal essence of women championed by the
essentialists has actually been defmed (or socially determined) by only the
experiences of white, middle class women. 145 In the place of this false singularity, some antiessentialists use the notion of "multiple consciousness" to
recognize that various facets of identity subject to oppression, such as gender, race, class, sexual orientation, age and ability, are all interconnected in
"inextricable webs."146
Although commendable for challenging the assumptions underlying both
essentialist and much mainstream feminist discussions of the similarity/difference between the sexes/genders, the social constructionists/antiessentialists nonetheless fail in their discussions of women and men to question a more fundamental assumption: that the two genders are themselves
stable, discrete bases for identity. As the discussion of the sex chromosome
test and genital look test has indicated, the poles of the biological
male/female sexual binary have proven to be far from dependable or predictable, or even neatly ascertainable. Applying the binary to the social
construction of gender offers no greater promise of conceptual stability .14 7
Drawing heavily on the work of Judith Butler, it is my contention that
the attempt at pinpointing a permanent identity along the continuum between
the sex/gender binary poles will be sufficiently precarious and problematic
to justify, even necessitate, a laissez-faire approach by the courts to the
question of gender identity.148
142. Fuss, supra note 136, at 2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2-3.
145. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
146. Id. at 587.
147. This social constructionist approach has been counterattacked by some staunch binarists. See, e.g., JOliN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A
GUIDE TO COUNSELING CmLDREN, ADOLESCENTS, AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 (1994) ("It simply
does not make sense to talk of a third sex, or of a fourth or fifth, when the phylogenetic
scheme of things is two sexes. Those who are genitally neither male nor female but incomplete are not a third sex. They are a mixed sex or an in-between sex. To advocate
medical nonintervention is irresponsible.").
148. Dunlap suggests replacing the two-sex assumption with a situationally variable
identity: a person "could make different determinations as to sex identification for various
purposes, such as education, marriage, living arrangements, or personal physical appearance." Dunlap, supra note 98, at 1138. This appears to be the approach taken by Tho-
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IV. TOWARD A MORE ENLIGHTENED APPROACH
There are many ways to describe people who have mixed their sexual
identity and gender identity: transsexual, transvestite, intersexual, and androgyne. Nonetheless, the law has been steadfast in classifying individuals
within a bipolar model of sex and gender. 149 One commentator, recognizing
that transsexuals have proven that biological sex is not necessarily fixed to
the sex of birth, and that the medical establishment itself has demonstrated
the difficulty in pinpointing an individual's sex, argues that this has provoked a renewed interest in asserting the male/female binary. In her words:
The resurrection of the male/female binary is motivated both by
medico-juridical definitions of successful trans sexuality and by the
juridical need to reaffirm the meanings of male and female that have
been paradoxically unsettled by a medical discourse objectively affirming the instability of "sex" as an anatomical or biological category.150
Although presented with the possibility that there might be more than
two discrete sexes, courts have been firm in their refusal to seriously consider the inclusion of new identities .151 There is of course the danger of
generating multiple subcategories. Mary Ann Case analogizes to the harmful splintering of racial identities into fine gradations based on the relative
fraction of racial composition. 152 In light of the potential for the fragmentation of identity for transgendered individuals, both rigid dichotomies and
elaborate taxonomies must be resisted. A fluid continuum between the poles
of the male/female binary could accommodate variation while avoiding the
danger of splintering. By using a more malleable model for sex/gender

149. Colker, supra note 12, at 65.
150. Bower, supra note 134, at 1024.
151. Franke, supra note 3, at 49-50 (footnotes omitted). Some doctors show similar resistance. See, e.g., MONEY, supra note 147, at 6.
Martha Minow notes the danger of multiple SUbcategories in her discussion of the
social construction of race in America in the 1920s. Finding that the tripartite
white/"Negro"f'Indian" schema apparently had no room for people of Mexican or Asian
descent, the Supreme Court treated them as the functional equivalent of ''Indians''-more
than slaves but less than free whites. "In retrospect, these results seem arbitrary. The legal authorities betrayed a striking inability to reshape their own categories for people who
did not fit." Martha Minow, Foreword, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10,70-71 (1987) (referring to Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.

•

178, 195 (1922)( emphasis added)).
152. Case offers this interesting cautionary criticism:
I personally am inclined to see slicing sex that fmely as . . . more troubling
than liberating (risking the reinforcement of hierarchies such as the ever
fmer slicing of racial classifications from Black and White to quadroon and
octoroon in antebellum Louisiana, or the distinction between Black, White,
and Colored in South African apartheid law).
Case, supra note 109, at 15 n.35.
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identity, transgendered individuals can "articulate the convergence of multiple sexual discourses at the site of 'identity' in order to render that category,
in whatever form, permanently problematic."153
It is noteworthy that transsexuals have at times unfortunately been accused of reaffirming the stability of the male/female binary. One Note has
argued that "[t]he transsexual is distinguishable from the homosexual in the
eyes of the law by her renaturalizing of rigid gender categories and by her
ability to pass. The state affords her benefits that it denies to gays and lesbians because she can be read as reinforcing rather than subverting the
boundary between masculinity and femininity." 154 This critique arises from
the fact that a transsexual who has successfully undergone sex reassignment
surgery "could fit at one of the poles rather than at the middle." 155 Along
these lines, a writer for a major national gay and lesbian magazine mischaracterizes transsexuals and gays/lesbians as engaged in "fundamentally different struggles."156 Specifically, she aligns transsexuals with sexual essentialists, and gays/lesbians with social constructionists. 157
By arguing for exclusively fluid identities, and denigrating fixed identities, these critics ignore the radical impact of biological sex reassignment on
our notions of gender identity. While one critic does acknowledge that
''transsexuality may be more destabilizing than homosexuality," slbe characterizes hislber analysis as having "deconstructed the illness trope and introduced the idea ofpassing."158 To dismiss true gender dysphoria and praise
the post-operative transsexual as nothing more complicated than the epitome
of "passing" is to profoundly misunderstand and mischaracterize the reality
and symbolism of trans sexuality. Dismissing the transsexual's desire to
make biology conform at last to herlhis gender identity misses the radically
performative nature of even biological sex. The notion of sexlgender-asperformance will be discussed more fully below.
The attempt at ordering fluid gender identities above those that are fixed
is misguided and even dangerous. In the analogous context of sexuality,
Gayle Rubin warns against the implications of such privileging and vilifica-

153. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 28.
154. Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodem Account of Gender, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1973, 1992-93 (1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Patriarchy Is Such a Drag].
155. Colker, supra note 12, at 44. Colker does not make this characterization. She notes
that "[w]hether the postoperative transsexual fits into a pole depends on whether he or she
'passes. ' The postoperative transsexual who does not pass is left in the indeterminate
middle category (for example, with respect to sex-segregated bathrooms) with neither men
nor women wanting to claim him or her as their own." Id. (footnote omitted).
156. Minkowitz, supra note 92, at 146. Bisexuals, and of course transgenders, are conspicuously absent from both the magazine's title (Out Magazine: America's Bestselling
Gay and Lesbian Magazine) and from most of its commentary.
157. Id.
158. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag, supra note 154, at 1993.
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tion.159 She notes that in the traditional social schema, married, reproductive heterosexuals occupy the highest social strata, monogamous homosexuals and bisexuals fall in the middle, and toward the bottom are found the
dregs of society, including transsexuals, transvestites, sadomasochists, and
sex workers (e.g., prostitutes, porn models, erotic dancers). Rubin argues
that such hierarchies are far from innocuous: "As sexual behaviors or occupations fall lower on the scale, the individuals who practice them are subjected to a presumption of mental illness, disreputability, criminality, restricted social and physical mobility, loss of institutional support, and
economic sanctions." 160
This privileging and vilification was demonstrated in 1988 by Texas
State District Court Judge Jack Hampton, who refused a life sentence for a
defendant convicted of killing two gay men. 161 Hampton explained that "I
put prostitutes and gays at about the same level and I'd be hard put to give
somebody life for killing a prostitute. "162 A similar disregard for the worth
of transgendered people has already been noted: the institutionalization of
the "GID aftlicted," the arrest of cross-dressers, and the murder of transsexuals.

A.

AMBIGUITY

[T]he body can no longer be seen as a biological given which
emits its own meaning. It must be understood instead as an ensemble of potentialities which are given meaning only in society.163

If gender is not tied to sex, either causally or expressively, then
gender is a kind of action that can potentially proliferate beyond
the binary limits imposed by the apparent binary of sex. . .. But
how would such a project become culturally conceivable and avoid
the fate ofan impossible and vain utopian project? 164
As discussed above, the General Court of Virginia in Thomas(ine) Hall
took a comparatively unusual stance toward gender/sex ambiguity in the

159. Rubin, supra note 85, at 267.
160. ld.
161. Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of 2 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1988, §1, at 8, cited and discussed in Jonathan Willmott, Victim Characteristics
and Equal Protection for the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland
and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed Standard for the Admission of Victim
Characteristics in Sentencing, 56 BROOK. 1. REv. 1045, 1047 (1990).
162. ld. Hampton further stated that if the victims "had not been out there spreading
AIDS around, they'd still be alive today." ld.
163. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 122-23 (1985), quoted in Franke,
supra note 3, at 71.
164. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 112.
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middle seventeenth century. 165 It is unclear from the record whether Hall
was an intersexual, whether s/he had a genital tubercle or other genital
anomaly, or whether s/he was an androgynous male with a small penis and
undescended testicles or an androgynous female with a large clitoris. Regardless of what s/he technically was, the case is noteworthy for how the legal system resolved the dilemma. Recognizing the impossibility of working
within the sexual binary, the court transcended established categories and
proclaimed the defendant to be both woman and man. This case is thus a
prime example of how "[b]iological sex is revealed to have no inevitable
natural meaning, but only the social meaning attached to it on the basis of
gender identity. "166 By ordering the publication of this determination in
Hall's community, that all might "know" what s/he was, the court explicitly
revealed the blatant social construction not only of gender, but of the understanding of biological sex itself. 167
Thomas(ine) Hall is nonetheless problematic in some respects. Although the court recognized that the categories of "woman" and "man" are
not fixed in stone, it was unwilling to allow Hall the true freedom to either
move fluidly between masculine and feminine appearance and identity, or to
live for periods as a man or a woman or both according to whim, as in fact
s/he had done for most of herlhis life. Instead of allowing Hall unfettered
discretion in herlhis personal appearance and identity, the court reimposed
the male/female binary in gross caricature: by forcing Hall to wear both
women's and men's clothing, the court forced herlhirn into stylistic admixture, a liminal no-person's-land of outfits doomed to be perceived as freakish. In terms of dress, s/he would no longer fit into either world.
Hall was not alone in being treated as an oddity. Transgendered individuals exhibiting ambiguous identities have long been reduced to circus
freaks. 168 Such delegitimization allows the kind of disregard for transgendered lives evidenced by the various attacks on transgendered people discussed above-most notably the slayings of Debbie Forte and Brandon
Teena, and the criminal proceedings against Sean O'Neill. The medical and
legal establishments must be held accountable for the oppressive norms they
generate.

165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
166. Patriarchy Is Such a Drag. supra note 154, at 1993.

167. This is not to suggest that there existed a ''neutral'' body prior to (re)nam:ing. The
complex interplay of sex and social construction will be discussed below.
168. "When there were circus side-shows, people gawked at the 'famous bearded lady'
or the 'incredible man-woman.' After the freak shows, there were the movies-most notably Fellini's SATYRICON, in which a pale, feeble hermaphroditic youth is disrobed and
shown to have both a penis and breasts." (citation omitted). Angier, supra note 11, at D8.
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CROSSING INTo TIIE THEORETICAL FRONTIER

Is there a "physical" body prior to the perceptually perceived body?
An impossible question to decide. 169
Joined, our bodies have passage into one/without merging

* **

And while the we conspires/to make secret its two eyes
we search the other shoreljor some crossing home. 170

Esther Newton, in a famous anthropological study of female impersonators, noted that while it seems obvious that "men" have to artificially create
the image of "women," women themselves have to create it through artifice. I71 Listing the items used by impersonators-"long hair, 'feminine'
make-up and dress, 'feminine' jewelry, bosom (false or hormone-induced),
and high-heeled shoes,"-she points out that ''the only item listed that is intrinsically more 'faked' for a male is the bosom. But what of padded
bras?"172
Judith Butler argues that "three contingent dimensions of significant
corporeality" are involved in this discussion: anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance. 173 Both male and female cross-dressing involve all three in complex interplay. She suggests that cross-dressing, by
imitating settled notions of a gender not considered by society to be one's
own (due to expectations based on anatomy), "implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself-as well as its contingency. "174 This suggests
that there exists
a radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the
169. BUILER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 114.
170. AUDRE LORDE, Bridge Through My Window, in CHOSEN POEMs--OLD AND NEW 1718 (1982).
171. ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA 5 n.14 (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP]' Female pop culture icons are an excellent case in point. Carole-Anne Tyler asserts that
the likes of Dolly Parton and Madonna (and their satin queen or Wanna-Be
parodies or imitations) [have become] more than chicks with cheek; they
have become draped crusaders for the social constructionist cause, catching
gender in the act-as an act-so as to demonstrate there is no natural, essential, biological basis to gender identity or sexual orientation.
Carole-Anne Tyler, Boys Will Be Girls: The Politics of Gay Drag, in INsIDFlOur:
LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 32 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
172. NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP, supra note 171, at 5 n.14
173. BUILER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 137. She explains that "[i]fthe anatomy of the performer is already distinct from the gender of the performer, and both of
those are distinct from the gender of the performance, then the performance suggests a dissonance not only between sex and performance, but sex and gender, and gender and performance." ld.
174. ld.
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face of cultural configurations of causal unities that are regularly
assumed to be natural and necessary .... [W]e see sex and gender
denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their distinctness and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their fabricated
unity. 175
Kennedy and Davis, in their account of a lesbian community in Buffalo,
N.Y., offer a good case in point: "Butch and fern mannerisms [in the
1940's] were modeled on male-female behavior as portrayed in the Hollywood movies of the period. They included all the little details of presenting
one's self-manner of walking, sitting, holding a drink, tone ofvoice."176 If
both women and men have to create the illusion of "woman" or "man,"
whether dressing or cross-dressing, the costume of womanhood/manhood is
revealed to be a gendered interpretation of what it means to be a "woman" or
a "man." Yet the interpretation is not expressive of any a priori (dare we
say essential?) identity, but rather a performance of cultural expectations.
Moving to a deeper level, Butler asks, "[a]re there ever humans who are
not, as it were, always already gendered?"177 She argues that there are not,
since the crucial naming of a child as "boy" or "girl" marks its moment of
humanization. 178 Her answer is unfortunate insofar as it appears to confuse
sex with gender: is the boy/girl label not indicative of biological sex rather
than gender identity? Nonetheless, given that, by her definition, no human is
pregender, the question arises: "If gender is always there, delimiting in advance what qualifies as the human, how can we speak of a human who becomes its gender, as if gender were a postscript or a cultural afterthought?"179 The question is rhetorical, for the Butlerian position appears
to be that one does not become a gender as much as one behaves in a gendered manner. In other words, gender is not so much who one is, but rather
what one does. The implication is that "[i]f gender attributes . . . are not
expressive but performative, then these attributes effectively constitute the
identity they are said to express or reveal." 180
If all gender is a performance, a "dramatic and contingent construction
of meaning,"181 from where do the norms that are played with and challenged arise? In the case of the lesbians in Buffalo, from where did Hollywood derive the male-female behavioral patterns on which the women based
their performance? Butler answers with the paradox that "gender is a kind
of imitation for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation

175. Id. (emphasis added).
KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39, at 157.
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at Ill.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 141.
181. Id. at 139.

176.
177.
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that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and consequence of
the imitation itself."182 Stated differently, "'the original' is revealed to be a
copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal that no one can embody."183 If
no one can actually embody original gender, the use of the law to punish socalled gender deviance raises troubling questions.
C.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW

Given the radical contingency of gender, the offensiveness of using the
legal system to punish transgendered individuals becomes clear. The prosecution of Sean O'Neill for "criminal impersonation of the opposite gender," 184 for instance, is a frightening indication of the extent to which the
state will go to enforce arbitrary gender-related behavioral roles. The vagrancy statute in both Archibald185 and Gillespie 186 was used to punish the
male defendants not for disguising themselves "in some basic anatomical
sense, but for donning artifacts socially associated with women." 187 Both
cases reflect a similar abuse of the state's power to coerce adherence to gendered clothing norms. Police harassment of butch lesbians for failure to
wear at least two items of feminine clothing 188 is revealed to be nothing less
than homophobic depredation by the state's uniformed thugs. And the Perez
court's consideration of female cross-dressing as relevant evidence of motive
for murder 189 strains belief.
As these cases reveal, the law's need for set, predictable rules for behavior "necessarily flounders when faced with variations of gender related behavior where, in fact, it is futile to establish a 'norm. "'190 Transgendered
individuals simply defy the medical and legal attempts to construct normative categories around dress, behavior, identity, and even biology.191 Karl
Klare argues that
[n]onconforming appearance choices can be highly subversive of the
182. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 21 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
Butler explains that "[i]f gender is drag, and if it is an imitation that regularly produces the ideal it attempts to approximate, then gender is a performance that produces the
illusion of an inner sex or essence or psychic gender core; it produces on the skin, through
the gesture, the move, the gait (that array of corporeal theatrics understood as gender presentation), the illusion of an inner depth." Id. at 28.
183. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 102, at 139.
184. See generally Minkowitz, supra note 92 and accompanying text.
185. People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
186. People v. Gillespie, 254 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964).
187. Whisner, supra note 8, at 100.
188. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 39 and accompanying text.
189. Perez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1973).
190. Gould, supra note 70, at 432.
19l. Butler argues that "[t]here are no direct expressive or causal lines between sex,
gender, gender presentation, sexual practice, fantasy, or sexuality. None of these terms
captures or determines the rest." Butler, supra note 182, at 25.
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status quo and therefore particularly in need of legal protection.
Appearance practices sometimes disrupt and shake-up settled understandings and roles, and they may dramatically suggest
("dramatically," in both senses) the need for new discursive possibilities and altered power relationships. 192
Ultimately, revealing gender to be nothing more than a '''performance, '"
a "'masquerade, '" would force not only a reevaluation of gender as a stable
binary, but would actually "call into question the system of 'masculine hegemony and heterosexist power' that underwrites them."193 It is therefore
not surprising to find that the society has been resolute in meting out punishment, both legal and extra-legal, for those who would dare to challenge
settled understandings of the meanings of gender.

CONCLUSION
Although the issue of a transgender identity might appear to mainstream
society to involve no more than the trials and tribulations of bizarre people
on the fringes of society, the interest in being able to cross gender and sex
lines is actually far from de minimis. The legal persecution oftransgendered
people has chilling Orwellian overtones: "The more comprehensive the government's authority to enforce the law's two-sex presumption [and its concomitant gender role expectations], and to punish departures from it, via
probes into the mental and psychological makeup of the individual [as well
as by dramatic emergency room inspections of genitalia], the more worthless
is the individual's right to privacy."194
As we have seen, even medicine cannot substantiate the essentialist
claim that the poles of the biological sex binary are absolute. Gendered
identities based on (at times) unstable sex identities are more hopelessly
complicated than the established medico-legal models allow. Given such a
heavily problematized juridical discourse, using the law to persecute transgendered individuals, who unavoidably chafe against society's arbitrary
limits for acceptable identity, is unconscionable.

192. Karl E. Klare, PowerlDressing; Regulation ofEmployee Appearance, 25 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 1395 (1992).
193. Bower, supra note 134, at 1027 (quoting BU1LER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note
100, at 33).
194. Dunlap, supra 98, at 1141.
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